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One would rightly assume that the cultural sector (the publicly-subsidised realm of arts 
performance, practice and display) is a fruitful and ever-evolving realm of ideas, 
imagination, and free thinking. Its relative autonomy and freedom from the instrumental and 
organisational exigencies of the economy lend weight to our assumption of its social value. 
Artistic culture can surely move beyond the provisional problem-solving methodologies that 
preoccupy the public policy mind-set, and further, can develop forms of participation, 
engagement and mutual interests that move beyond the ideologically-ridden strife of political 
party allegiances. Artistic culture promises (and indeed, on some level delivers) a 
philosophically more profound meditation on society and the shape of contemporary life, 
and a more perceptive interrogation of the aesthetic and intellectual conditions of social 
well-being.  
 
And yet, it is the case that the cultural sector, despite its sophisticated institutional mediation 
of artistic cultural practices, barely registers its presence in the orbit of political deliberations 
we refer to as the public sphere. The sub-text of my paper is a complaint, that the cultural 
sector could make more of an impact on public discourse, more broadly engaging with the 
political conditions of social life. Arguably it does not. The subject of the paper, however, is 
‘faith communities’, which I argue (albeit briefly) are a significant yet ignored part of the 
cultural sector. Faith communities could play a role in developing a cultural public sphere, or 
ways in which ‘culture’ becomes a substantive discourse on social life.  
 
The purpose of this paper is largely theoretical – yet motivated by six months of ad hoc 
research, travelling around the UK visiting 55 faith groups, from churches to mosques, 
monastic base communities to evangelistic and lobby organizations. This quasi-expedition 
was not framed by ethnographic methodology or any other pre-set data gathering. It was 
simply a ‘scoping’ exercise in identifying research issues, concerns and interested parties. 
My interest in culture moves beyond the sociological confines of the individual agency, 
organisational and institutional structures of cultural production, its products, distribution and 
consumption. With ‘faith’ the ‘aesthetics’ of cultural production (the spaces, social interaction 
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and dynamics of communication, the experience of symbolic and ritually-embedded values, 
and so on) are just as important. My experience was rich – I am now attempting to formulate 
some theoretical questions on the current cultural conditions of faith in this country, and 
future possibilities. I do so as I witnessed how faith communities demonstrate an 
extraordinary range of cultural competencies, maintain unique facilities, strategic 
management practices, transnational networks and organizational formations of all kinds – 
yet find themselves excluded from the usual public policy contexts in which cultural 
production is awarded privileged attention.  
 
Of course, the status of ‘religion’ in modern society has always been problematic, and more 
so if religion maintains an emphatic relationship with public culture, like the Roman Catholic 
or Orthodox church in southern Europe. Unlike most of contemporary culture, however, 
religion and religious groups (I’ll attend to the distinction between faith and religion in a 
moment), have rarely been seamlessly unified with State power. Today, religion continues 
to maintain a high level of autonomy, and is actually not often successfully co-opted by 
particular social or political movements (however much social and political movements have 
mobilised religious sentiment or values). Moreover, religion is fairly resilient against the 
onslaught of consumer capital and the envelopment of artistic culture within the cycles of 
general consumption and distribution.  
 
On the whole, religion is remarkably successful as a cultural enterprise. It accomplishes 
something every political regime or other kind of organization fails to do – manage ‘cultural 
transmission’, or the historic self-perpetuation of specific and consistently held doctrines, 
values, organizational formations and leadership. It does so over generations, and centuries 
and vast geographic spaces. Religion maintains the power to affect individual as well as 
collective experience and subjective or social re-orientation, as well as basic forms of 
community cooperation. As noted by major writers in the ‘secularization’ debates (from 
Casanovas to Habermas) the surprising rise of new religious social formations demonstrate 
an ability to arm their members with an ethically-charged lexicon of articulate beliefs, 
engendering a certain cultural reflexivity in their orientation to consumer society. More than 
most ordinary citizens, religious adherents possess an ability to resist societal norms or 
economic trends. In my preliminary fieldwork I encountered many young educated groups of 
Christians, Muslims and Jews, who demonstrated an extraordinary level of critical 
awareness of the ethical dynamics of consumer society and the complex changing 
relationship between civil associations and the State.  
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We are no doubt familiar with the current rhetorical characterisations of ‘faith’ in the public 
sphere, reinforcing their public policy exclusion from the cultural sector. For the media, faith 
is depicted as culturally outmoded religion struggling to reconcile everyday life in 
contemporary secular society with idealistic aspirations for humanity underwritten by some 
barely conceivable metaphysical power. Of course, as a sophisticated and psychologically 
nuanced form of superstition it is socially useful as a palliative for grief or the anxieties of old 
age, and for the preservation of the ancient ecclesiastical arts, particularly music, and 
heritage more broadly.  
 
In recent public policy and Government common rhetorical characterisations of faith are, 
perhaps ironically, more favourable: since the mid-years of New Labour, (from around David 
Blunkett’s Home Office report in 2004: ‘Working Together: cooperation between 
Government and faith communities’) the term religion was strategically substituted for ‘faith’. 
‘Faith communities’ were enthusiastically enrolled in New Labour’s public policy as dynamic 
sociological expressions of identity and historical ethical traditions, useful in neighbourhood 
and social welfare ventures (a good overview of such can be found in Dinham, Furbey and 
Lowndes’ Faith in the Public Realm, Bristol: Policy Press, 2009).  
 
Lastly, for the New Atheists (led by Hitchens, Dawkins, et. al.) – perhaps most influential in 
educational and media spheres – the persistence of religious groups is just one, albeit 
culturally pivotal, expression of a fundamental philosophical irrationalism. For Hitchens 
religion is the anti-enlightenment impulse in all authoritarianism, breeding social ‘extremism’ 
and a sensibility prone to prejudice (Hitchens, 2007). On account of its perceived relation to 
traditional patriarchal ‘family values’, faith bears a natural affinity with the political Far Right 
(though, curiously not with the Far Left, even though most religions are by their nature about 
collective allegiance and community).  
 
For me, there are two interesting characteristics of the New Atheists. First is their somewhat 
outmoded enlightenment rationalism (has Dawkins ever read Popper or Feyerabend? Has 
Hitchens ever heard of postmodernism and the epistemological challenge of anti-
foundationalism?) Second, the New Atheists are consciously post-secular atheists; that is, 
theirs is a neo-enlightenment rationalism consciously using scientific rationalism as a 
cultural discourse not a scientific one (hence the repeated consternation of many in the 
scientific community over Dawkins’ more radical claims for evolution against religious 
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belief). Scientific credibility is not where their claims stand or fall. They attain to cultural 
credibility, eliding fact/value distinctions and the real epistemological problems science has 
in constructing historical narratives from highly fragmentary empirical data. In all, with a 
side-glance at the USA and the very tight correlation between religion and collective political 
behaviour, many in the UK today would concur that religion is not desirable as a force in 
political life, not even as a cultural resource for marginalised communities (outlined by 
American scholars like Rhys Williams), not even ‘culture wars’ as defined by James Davison 
Hunter (Hunter, 1992).  
 
It seems to me that the Left-Liberal paranoia about religion is more influenced by the USA, 
than UK, experience of what has become an extremely diverse and quite fascinating realm 
of faith practices and communities. If anything, I would accuse the faith sector of failed 
nerve in blithely tolerating such a catalogue of political judgements derived from a partial 
and stereotypical view of the American culture wars. For the most part faith groups remain 
in their sub-cultural enclave and do not demand much of a role in public culture (beyond the 
‘official’ voice of the mainstream Anglican clergy). My gambit is that the emergence of a 
more vocal and challenging faith sector could become a catalyst for the arts and culture 
sphere itself to move out its own rather grand and handsomely patronised sub-cultural 
enclave. [As an aside: redefining public culture as a cultural ‘sector’ was a strategic New 
Labour policy development, affecting a shift in the categorisation of the arts from the 
nebulous realms of subsidised patrimony and heritage into ‘industry’, while still maintaining 
its once-removed status from the public sphere.]  
 
Faith communities, then, need to be theoretically re-positioned, as part of cultural policy 
discourse, where faith communities are assessed as autonomous organs of cultural 
production. Cultural policy is primarily a politics of recognition – it possesses the discursive 
authority to enfranchise emergent organizations and groups in a national discussion on 
culture, values, cultural rights and liberties, legitimate expressions of identity, and so on. 
Cultural policy then entails the leverage of resources and their distribution. I speak from a 
new strain of cultural policy research – Implicit cultural policy analysis, such as the recent 
work of Oliver Bennett and Jeremy Ahearne (Ahearne, 2009). Their research has attempted 
(among other things) to locate and uncover the way organizations or social movements not 
admitted or belonging to the ‘cultural sector’ act nonetheless as agents of significant cultural 
action.    
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In travelling the terrain of faith in this country, I encountered what I recognised as familiar 
rhetorical characteristics in the visual culture, spatialization, and choreography of faith with 
what I would define as ‘avant-garde cultural production’. My theoretical work therefore 
involves re-positioning ‘faith’ as a cultural practice within public policy discourse using the 
idea of ‘faith as a contemporary cultural avant-garde’. The concept and historical 
phenomena of the European avant-gardes, of course, are in part only deployed by way of 
analogy or used as an heuristic. Yet it is more than that. In a more extensive argument (that 
would go beyond this paper) I would attempt to explain the general consensus among art 
historians and critics on how an artistic (art movement or art world) avant-garde is 
impossible in the present time (the work of T.J. Clarke, Hal Foster, Benjamin Buchloh, 
Thierry de Duve, argue that the conditions for avant-garde art are generally unavailable, as 
indeed the conditions for any kind of radical social change under capitalism is impossible). I 
would respond to this by pointing out that avant-garde cultural formations can operate 
beyond the practice of art-making, and that the discursive ‘spaces’ of the avant-garde within 
contemporary culture still remain. By this I mean that we still possess cultural spaces of 
resistance to socio-economic norms enforced by the State, but these are no longer (or no 
longer just) the spaces of art production, but the spaces of the reproduction of religious 
community (perhaps using visual art in the process).     
 
By avant-garde I am referring largely to the artist groups from the 1920s and 1930s – from 
Dada to Duchamp, Futurism, Constructivism, Surrealism, De Stijl – up to the so-called neo-
avant-garde recapitulations of their visual and urban strategies, the neo-Dada, minimal art, 
process art, performance, and so on and on. My correlation of faith communities and the 
avant-garde is not motivated by empirical-historical similarity, obviously, but by the enduring 
presence of the avant-garde in our cultural memory and historical narratives of modernism, 
modernity and post-modern culture. The avant-garde (modernist) and neo-avant-garde 
(postmodernist) dominate our narratives on art and cultural history, as evidenced in our art 
museums or university courses on art history. Sociologically speaking, they were of course 
but a fraction of the art (by tiny groups of artists) to have operated throughout these cultural 
epochs. As historians like Peter Bürger and Fredric Jameson have shown, the original 
avant-garde became embedded in historical narrative and artistic practice through its 
‘recapitulation’ in the neo-avant-garde, where the latter performed a hermeneutics of 
creative practice (an art that was as much an interpretation and conceptual re-identification 
of the original avant-garde as it was of art-making) (Bürger, 1984; Jameson, 1991).  
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My point here is that ‘avant-garde’ remains a fulcrum of art’s history and more generally 
cultural memory, not simply as it became a marker for a lost quasi-political battle (the failure 
of creative practice – art, literature, poetry, performance – in becoming formative of socio-
political consciousness), but because it became and is now a site of cultural mourning for a 
lost aspiration in contemporary culture (and practically, a lost facility for active radical 
citizenship).  
 
Apart from the realms of public and urban art (which all have their particular value), it is 
difficult to conceive of a means today by which art can provide a cognitive frame within 
which activism can operate and intervene in public thinking on the fundamental political 
conditions of social existence. The fundamental impulse of the avant-garde was precisely 
the materialisation in social life of the aesthetic dynamics of the creative process – more 
formally, pushing culture into the public sphere, where both would be transformed.  
 
So how can – (and of course I have committed myself to a path of generalisations here, only 
comforted by the fact that politics is driven by rank generalisations) – faith communities be 
defined as a cultural avant-garde?  The matter lies not directly with the perspicacity or 
validity of the doctrines or ‘belief-content’ of faith, but something broader – the functional 
cultural-operation of faith, its ‘strategic management’ and the aesthetics of its organization, 
including its creative techniques of communication. The historical significance or indeed 
popularity of the avant-garde is not a matter of a perceived aesthetic professionalism in its 
cultural production, or the artistic superiority of its artistic products, or the political-
philosophical credibility of its writings or manifestos – far from it. The significance of the 
avant-garde lay in how it mediated the complex shifts in cultural consciousness as the 
citizens of France, Germany, Austria and so on, faced increasing political authoritarianism, 
corruption, conformity, militarism, and the continual prospect of war. I say ‘mediated’ and 
not represented or just depicted, as the nature of mediation is active, and is where the 
media itself becomes internal to both subject and content. The avant-garde were not 
concerned with ‘representation’ so much as presentation, or direct articulation of pressing 
anxieties. Before we broach the correlation between avant-garde and faith communities, 
however, we do need some sociological clarification, living as we do in country in which a 
constitutional church is still embedded [In England we all live in ‘parishes’, whatever religion 
we belong to].  
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The famous American art critic Clement Greenberg wrote one of the first theoretically 
grounded essays on avant-garde art, in New York’s Partisan Review, in 1939, the terms of 
which is relevant here (Greenberg, 1939/). In surveying the cultural landscape, Greenberg 
differentiated between three cultural phenomena determining both American and European 
cultural production, from TV to abstract painting. These were Alexandrianism, Kitsch, and 
avant-garde. The first, Alexandrianism, was essentially the art of the European art 
Academies, continuing as always by repeating the canonical principles and practices of the 
past golden epochs of classical perfection (emerging from the seminal works of the Italian 
Renaissance). Alexandrianism appealed not just to immutable truths, but universal forms of 
expression (artistic convention) developed over centuries, which could not be challenged as 
such, only fulfilled. Kitsch (appropriating the German term), was, rather, the popular 
articulation of these very expressions. It was certainly sophisticated in its own way 
(technically, it required a high level of artistic skill), but its work was to prepare fine art for 
mass culture. Kitsch for Greenberg was ‘academicized simulacra’ or a visual replication of 
high art in the cause of a democratization of culture. The ‘mass culture’ in question was, of 
course, the emerging American mass media culture of the 1930s, advertising, TV, 
magazines and Hollywood movies. The aesthetics of mass art seemed radical (or rather, 
innovative) as it was mediated by new communication technologies (of photography, film, 
colour print). They were, however, aesthetically conservative (as Greenberg noted, the 
labouring classes always preferred Raphael to Picasso).  
 
Into this cultural milieu, and as a response to it, emerged the avant-garde. The avant-garde 
was not, for Greenberg, a style or genre of artistic practice – it was a social formation of 
cultural actors, who held that despite evidence to the contrary, culture was not flowering but 
animated by destructive forces. Their response was not to ‘revive’ culture (which 
Alexandrianism was in any case always doing), so much as to create a surrogate culture, a 
culture that was capable of both fulfilling and living culture’s aspiration (for expression, 
articulation of belief, representation of identity and philosophical meaning, for sensual visual 
stimulation), but also for understanding the contemporary conditions of culture, the socio-
historical condition of culture itself at that present time. Avant-garde was both an experience 
of art, and an experience of the conditions of art making (increasingly impossible conditions 
– where it was becoming impossible to ‘represent’ life, nature, or social value, under rapid 
modernisation and industrialisation, combined with the impossibility of political 
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representation under conditions of imperial militarism and authoritarianism). Thus an ‘anti-
art’ was required to define the nature of this impossibility. The avant-garde was therefore a 
moment of critical consciousness, where the limits of social life were identified in the act of 
transgressing them. The avant-garde was thus as much diagnostic as creative.  
 
Returning to faith communities: in an age when all radical political alternatives and the 
intellectually generative power of politics itself has dissolved, they provide an alternative 
cognitive context and ethical reflexivity for thinking culture. They embody both the cultural 
dissolution of social community, values and beliefs under the rising State authoritarianism – 
for faith communities are symptomatic of divided and fragmented social culture. And they 
engage in a diagnostic critique of the conditions of modern social life: their faith is defined in 
and against the ruling ideologies and common belief systems that drive the values of 
consumer everyday life. At least, that’s my gambit.   
 
So when I talk about faith communities as a cultural avant-garde we perhaps need to 
consider what is outside institutional religion (the religious ‘Alexandrianism’ of the 
established churches, for example), and also outside their many vibrant popular, 
commercialised and successfully marketed versions (the ‘kitsch’ of evangelicalism). Nor 
would I – and this may be counter-intuitive – identify the avant-garde as the Left-Liberal 
wing of contemporary religious groups, the revisionists and reformers, trying to reinterpret 
their faith through current paradigms of popular political trends (the ruling ideologies and 
common belief systems that drive the values of consumer everyday), or ‘diversity and 
equality’, or scientific conceptions of evolutionary human origins. Many of the faith 
communities I have come across are not ‘liberals’ in a loose sense, but hold strong 
convictions that on the face of it may seem like Alexandrianism conservatism (like Salvador 
Dali, adopting the retentive style of eighteenth century naturalism). They are, in their own 
way, radical, but not equivalent to national cultural conservatism. Of interest here, is the 
expressive form that faith takes in the context of its social communities, and the aesthetics 
and politics of the faith community. Faith is not simply religion, but a life lived out in dynamic 
reflexivity both to existing conditions of community; it registers the boundaries of human 
relations as they are inscribed within current political norms, and multiple contexts of mass, 
media and consumer cultural life. It is (or can be) a form of enlightenment, not forgetting the 
ways in which religious authorities or the processes or institutionalisation or sectarianism 
can curtail its enlightenment potential.  
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The cultural production of contemporary faith – using the avant-garde as a paradigm – 
betrays the following characteristics: [and here I am abstracting from the literature on avant-
garde movements, by Poggioli, Burger, Foster and Buchloh, among others].  
 
First is an experience of cultural dissolution. This, famously, is the ‘shock value’ of the 
avant-garde – the clash of the routine, regular or accepted in everyday life, and the assault 
of ‘the new’. Mainstream culture finds itself with an enemy or opponent who threatens to 
render it inadequate. There is a certain irony in the way religion and faith communities, even 
though they are for the most part derived from historical and even ancient texts, doctrines 
and rituals, can confront the everyday life of consumer society as offering something ‘new’ 
or radically different. This new experience is often cultivated as a spatial practice, where 
new faith communities invariably use a specific delimited space (such as a faith centre or 
place or worship) that is reserved precisely for the articulation and expression of its 
distinctive cultural experiences. For the subject, these spaces undertake what is called 
(after Duchamp) ’recontextualisation’ and the work of ‘de-familiarisation’ through a radical 
shift in attention, priorities, worldview and social context. ‘Recontextualising’ a person’s life 
or subjectivity (thought, feeling, allegiances), not only affords the subject a strong sense of 
possibility for personal transformation, but transformation through community membership. 
 
This leads to the second avant-garde characteristic – the impulse to make ‘art into life’. 
Inherited from the German romantics, this became a ruling ethos of the avant-garde in all its 
forms, where ‘art’ (as we saw with Greenberg) was subject to a critical scrutiny as to its 
social function. For the avant-garde, whatever the aesthetic virtues of what we may call 
‘institutional fine art culture’ (the art of the Academies and the museums), ‘art’ had become 
co-opted by the culture of ruling elites, who in turn were perpetuating objectionable 
ideologies and unacceptable forms of authoritarianism. The role of fine art culture in the 
evolution of class sensibility, values and political aspirations, is a complicated matter, and 
not one subject to much historical theorisation by the avant-garde, save to refer to Marxist 
notions of rising bourgeois supremacy. For us, the relevant issue is transformation. The 
avant-garde sought to purge artistic practice of those artistic forms that had been co-opted 
by mainstream society (or the ruling elites) and to use art for the purposes of transformation. 
Art thus was as much about ‘movements’ and new social formations of change as it was 
about individual objects or works of art (the kind of art that itself generated change and a 
discourse of change). It was as much about individuation through collective creativity as it 
was discovering basic human needs and aspirations. Avant-garde was art that generated 
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possible conditions for change, however small. As a sub-culture ii presented an opportunity 
for social reinvention, identity-conversion, and lifestyle transformation. The avant-garde 
bohemian became the common symbol of this lifestyle.   
 
Our third characteristic is ‘creative syncretism’. Avant-garde, though fond of sects, factions 
and manifestos, were not puritanical or doctrinaire with regard the tools or media of art. The 
avant-garde processes by which all socially retrograde or conservative conventions or 
meanings were expunged from art, was conducted by an open and adventurous approach 
to artistic production. There was no longer any contradiction between the materiality of art 
and materiality of life, for the latter was material for the former. The avant-garde was 
experimental and used domestic or industrial detritus, new technologies like photography 
and film, or mundane objects. Conventions of production were also re-inscribed within 
constructed local contexts of value – where the value of the work of art object was entirely 
relative to its impact in a certain situation (it’s ‘event’ nature). In other words, everyday life 
was not anathema and not a threat or contaminating force. It could be used in ways that 
could be called eclectic and eccentric. The ways in which faith communities work in 
improvised and ad hoc environments, usually with limited financial means, is indicative of 
this.  
 
Lastly, avant-garde cultural practice involves a radical scepticism of all forms of social and 
cultural authority. Once the avant-garde has been experienced and has generated a certain 
conviction and allegiance, then a contest begins between the ‘law’ of the community and the 
law of broader society. This in itself generates a higher degree of social and political 
awareness, where the subjectivity of faith and the obligations of citizenship are often in 
contradiction. Avant-garde sub-cultures openly lives through conflict and contradiction as 
mechanisms of differentiation and further motivation for change.   
 
My purpose in this paper, therefore, has simply been to re-define contemporary faith 
communities in terms of a cultural avant-garde, and out of the usual anachronistic (and 
inaccurate) portrayals of faith as ‘religious belief’ in the media. In doing so, we open up a 
number of questions on their social, and public role. I have argued (albeit in a circuitous 
fashion) that contemporary faith communities possess a certain unique role, whereby in 
mobilising their resources they could make some profound contribution to the current 
debates on public culture, its politics and meaning. The opportunity for cultural dissolution, 
conflict and provisional community, individual reinvention, all managed in a context of 
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creative improvisation, is altogether a social phenomenon worth considering, and 
considering in its potential presentation of resistance, dissent, and alternative viewpoints in 
the public sphere. A naïve fear of proselytization is no excuse for avoiding the intellectual 
impact of genuine pluralism in our public debates on culture, values and the public good.   
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